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Abstract: Globalization can be read as consequential reordering, where 
national rules of law increasingly have to confront the progress of a 
transnational law of rules. We use conceptual building blocks from political 
science and sociological institutionalism to approach two sets of issues. First, 
we explore the nature of this consequential reordering and some of its 
structuring dynamics. We underscore some of the key features of the 
emergent transnational law of rules system and contrast it with more 
traditional, nationally bound, rule of law systems. Second, we consider the 
potential local, or national, impact of such profound reordering. In the 
conclusion, we identify key channels and mechanisms of impact as well as 
potential sources of resistance or of local adaptation. An exploration of those 
early propositions would be useful to both scholars and practitioners as it 
would make it possible to read, understand, and even anticipate the 
variability of cases and situations.
The literature on globalization takes the nation-state seriously, but 
the issue is contentious and polarizing. On the one hand, the 
argument goes that globalization implies a weakening, if not a 
decline, of national polities and their order-creating capacities with a 
parallel increasing role for markets and market logics (Held and 
McGrew 1998; Ohmae 
1995;<Ohmae (1995) is not in the References.> Strange 1996,). On 
the other hand, the demise of the nation-state is contested, and its role is 
reaffirmed as central in the context of a multilevel governance landscape 
(Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996).
This article starts from a different perspective. Globalization is not 
about the disappearance of rules and order. In fact, we have more and more 
evidence that globalization comes together with an increasing density 
of regulatory and governance activities of all kinds (Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). And nation-states indeed 
do not disappear. They remain involved, but they are also profoundly 
transformed, we argue, in the process. New organizations, networks, 
and communities emerge and come together around a multiplicity of 
different regulatory projects and agendas. This is increasingly taking 
place across and beyond national boundaries. An important task for 
those organizations, networks, or communities is to codify, frame, and 
standardize practices, in particular by negotiating and issuing rules, 
norms, or standards. They are also involved in the elaboration and ac-
tivation of processes that make it possible to monitor the adoption and 
implementation of those rules, norms, or standards. From this perspec-
tive, the strength of national polities is not being merely displaced and 
replaced by the raw and anomic power of market logics. The consti-
tutional rule of law characteristic of a Westphalian world does not, in 
other words, dissolve into the logics of a global runaway market. Still, 
we argue here that contemporary evolutions do reflect a consequential 
displacement—it is not simply business as usual. This displacement is 
one where the national rule of law has to come to terms with a dense 
landscape of rules often produced and monitored transnationally. The 
national rule of law has, in other words, to confront the progress of a 
transnational law of rules.
Hence, we view globalization as a consequential process of reorder-
ing, and our project in this article is double. A first objective is to explore 
further the nature of this reordering and uncover the dynamics of a gov-
ernance world where the transnational law of rules tends to confront or 
subvert the national rule of law. A second objective is to assess the po-
tential impact of such reordering on local structures and processes. There 
is now a rich stream of literature upon which we can build to approach 
those two sets of issues. In the next section, we identify in particular some 
key and useful insights from within political science and sociological 
institutionalism. Bridging those insights allows us to conceptualize the 
dynamics of contemporary transnational governance. Beyond the ap-
parent complexity and unruly nature of contemporary transnational rule 
making, we search for those structuring dimensions and regularities that 
frame the transnational governance landscape and its dynamics. We then 
turn to the confrontation between those dynamics and the more traditional 
logics of a national rule of law system. Finally, we probe in the conclud-
ing section the potential local affect of such a profound transformation 
of governance dynamics and outline a number of possible paths that may 
occur. We identify key channels and mechanisms of the impact as well 
as potential sources of resistance or of local adaptation. An exploration 
of those early propositions would be useful to both the scholar and the 
practitioner as it would make it possible to read, understand, and even 
anticipate the variability of cases and situations.
Exploring governance: Theory building blocks
The concept of governance implies not only rule making in a particular 
sphere of human or social activity but also the tools and mechanisms 
that allow implementation, monitoring, and control of the products of 
rule making. We start to have a rich base of empirical evidence telling 
us about a profoundly changing landscape of governance over the past 
few decades (e.g., Bostrom and Garsten 2008; Djelic and Quack 2003; 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Graz and Nölke 2007; Levi-Faur 
and Jordana 2005). The very definition of rule making, the nature of its 
products, the types of actors involved, the paths to implementation, and 
the modes of control and monitoring are all going through significant 
transformation. For a great part of the twentieth century, governance 
remained essentially tied to nation-states and national rules of law. 
What has changed over the past few decades is the increasing degree of 
transnationalization, both of issues to be governed and of governance 
processes, actors, and mechanisms.
Political science and sociology are rich sources of theoretical insight 
on the question of governance, rule making, and rule monitoring. Both 
disciplines have had to confront and deal with the evolution of the nature 
of governance discussed here. They have adapted some of their theoreti-
cal tools to do so but in an uncoordinated manner overall. We identify 
here some of the most interesting insights we can draw from recent 
contributions in those disciplines. We then propose a way to bridge those 
disconnected insights in order to gain theoretical leverage.
Political science on governance actors
Traditionally, political scientists have approached issues of governance 
from a state-centered perspective. This has even been the case for the 
subset of contributions focusing, within political science, on international 
relations. The idea that states are the central pillars of rule making and 
governance, within but also across national boundaries, still shapes large 
parts of that literature (Martin 2005).<In the reference and below in 
the text, it is (2003).> The influence of states can be direct through law 
making or other forms of regulatory activities. It can also be more indirect 
through delegation at the subnational or supranational level.
In the face of a changing world, a first line of reaction, within politi-
cal science, to this mainstream perspective, was to point to a progressive 
“retreat of the state” (Strange 1996). Many spheres of human and social 
activity were stretching beyond a given national jurisdiction. In parallel, 
privatization and the partial dismantling of public services and welfare 
states were then at the core of reform programs across the world (e.g., 
Djelic 2006; Kogut and MacPherson 2008;<In the reference, it was 
Macpherson for both Kogut and Macpherson (2008) and Macpherson 
(2006).> MacPherson 2006; Vogel 1996,). Arguably, though, states were 
not so much retreating as profoundly changing. The concept of “regu-
latory states” was coined precisely to convey this idea (Majone 1996; 
Moran 2002). Regulatory states are not less influential than interventionist 
states, but they are embedded in complex constellations of actors and 
structures (e.g., Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler 2000; O’Brien et al. 2000). 
Arguing that the concept of a regulatory state may itself be misleading 
as it still sends the signal of a central role for states in rule making and 
governance, Scott (2004) introduced the idea of “post-regulatory states.” 
This concept suggests a blurring of the distinction between public and 
private actors, states, and markets, and a much more decentered view of 
regulation that relies on mechanisms not directly associated with state 
authority or sanctioning power.
Together with the idea of a transformation, if not a retreat, of the state 
came an interest, in the political science literature, for the expansion of 
private authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Hall and Biersteker 
2002). This notion has an interesting parallel in premodern (i.e., pre-
nation-states) times, when private authority spanning local communi-
ties was an important source of rule making and governance. The lex 
mercatoria (or merchant law) is a fascinating example of this (Berman 
and Kaufman 1978; Lehmkuhl<In the reference, it is Lemkuhl.> 2003; 
Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). The modern concept of private 
authority is broad and encompassing. It suggests a multiplicity of rule 
making and governance activities that emerge and are structured outside 
states. It also points, beyond the state and public agencies, to a diverse 
set of actors involved in one way or another in those activities. An im-
portant underlying concept here is that of networks: webs of connections, 
interactions, collaboration, and/or competition between many different 
actors, all interested by a particular governance challenge. The concept 
of networks, though, can conjure up different kinds of realities.
Starting in the 1980s already, Kees van der Pijl and the Amsterdam 
school looked at social networks and transnational class formation using 
the concept in its descriptive and first-level sense (Overbeek 2004; Van 
der Pijl 1984, 1988). A little later, Haas (1989, 1992) also pointed to 
the importance of networks as key mechanisms of governance crossing 
over state boundaries. He used the term “epistemic communities” to de-
scribe networks structured around shared expertise and practices. Within 
epistemic communities, the glue stems from common cognitive patterns 
and value schemes, stabilized in part through socialization processes, 
even more than from direct and regular social interaction (Haas 1992). 
More recent contributions talk about regulatory networks, underscoring 
the wide variety of public and private actors involved in rule making and 
rule monitoring (e.g., Schmidt 2004). The idea of regulatory networks 
points to complex interconnections between a multiplicity of individual 
and organizational actors, interconnections that can be direct or mediated. 
The idea also suggests organizational, cognitive, and normative frames 
or arenas in which those interactions take place and are structured.
Sociology and the embeddedness of governance
Political science hence contributes important insights to our understand-
ing of a changing landscape of governance actors. It tells us less, though, 
about the structuring frames in which these actors function. For this, 
contributions coming from sociology—and particularly institutional soci-
ology—prove useful. Institutional sociology takes us in two different and, 
we argue, complementary directions. Bridging the insights from those 
two strands of institutionalism can help us better understand the ways in 
which institutional embeddedness shapes the evolution of contemporary 
governance, and this evolving governance, in turn, progressively trans-
forms institutions and the nature of institutional embeddedness.
The world society school, or cultural institutionalism, provides us with 
a first set of interesting insights. The work of John Meyer and associates 
underscores the importance of bringing in cultural processes to understand 
how individuals, organizations, and states function and change (Krücken 
and Drori 2008). Beyond agency and strategy, what may be more im-
portant are the cultural frames in which they are located. World society 
is not only a society of powerful actors; it is a society permeated by and 
permeating actors with cultural values or institutional frames (Meyer et 
al. 1997). Another interesting insight is that these frames are increasingly 
shaped and diffuse as global blueprints that are used to benchmark and 
possibly transform states and other actors. There is no global state, but 
the alternative is neither chaos nor anarchy. This line of research and its 
elaborate theory of world society are enlightening. Studies within this 
tradition show that states remain important regulators but that they are 
themselves embedded in, and shaped by a powerful world society and 
its associated templates. This is also the case, naturally, for all other 
types of actors involved in one way or another in ongoing processes of 
governance. These studies, however, focus mostly on how global models 
and blueprints diffuse, potentially shaping localized discourse and/or 
structures and activities. We learn less, though, on where those models 
come from, that is, on the ways in which they are being negotiated and 
constructed. We also lack, within that perspective, an understanding of 
actual processes and mechanisms of diffusion and local reception.
Another strand of institutional contributions, often brought together 
under the label of “historical institutionalism,” offers a different set of 
insights that are, arguably, quite complementary. The idea here is that 
contemporary forms of governance do not emerge ex nihilo but set them-
selves in relation to and against the background of earlier, mostly national, 
systems of rules and modes of governance (Dobbin 1994; Fligstein 1990; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Maurice and Sorge 2000; Whitley 1999). This type 
of argument has had the merit of showing the contingence of arrangements 
and institutions, and the embeddedness of forms of governance, introduc-
ing in the process the idea of contextualized efficiencies. Naturally, in a 
world where transactions and interactions increasingly take on a trans-
national dimension, we cannot interpret action as merely the expression 
of nationally bound logics. Still, we should take this insight seriously, 
and this implies that questions of interface become important. Hence, we 
need to explore how previous governance efforts, often national, pave 
the way for and lead to new modes of governance or how they may on 
the contrary resist or react to them. We need to understand how different 
rule systems and governance modes interact and interplay.
Transnational governance: Conceptualizing the dynamics
In de la démocratie en Amérique, his famous opus on American society 
and polity, Alexis de Tocqueville reflected in the following way:
American society appears dynamic and agitated because men and things 
change constantly but it also appears monotonous because all those 
changes are always the same. (1993 [1840], vol. II, 281)
This turns out to be, in fact, an apt descriptive formula for our contem-
porary world of transnational governance. Transnational arenas of gover-
nance are highly dynamic and apparently in constant flux. It is easy, at one 
level, to point to intense activity and activism, dense and multidirectional 
interplays that can appear unruly if not chaotic. If we explore this activism 
further, though, we can identify a number of stable and regular patterns. 
Those patterns apply across the board in multiple arenas of governance. 
Building upon and combining the theoretical insights presented above, 
we can go beyond descriptive empirical accounts and conceptualize the 
dynamics of contemporary transnational governance.
An appearance of activism and chaotic agitation
A Westphalian—or state-centered—conception of governance would 
be associated with the relatively easy identification of well-delineated 
centers of decision and rule making. The topography of contemporary 
governance is very different in that respect. Rule making is decentered 
and often in fact multicentered. The topography of transnational gov-
ernance is fragmented rather than unified. Instead of having a small 
number of powerful centers (i.e., nation-states) from which rule making 
irradiates toward multiple spheres of social and human life, we have a 
multiplicity of fields of governance that connect and overlap to a varying 
extent. Increasingly, these fields of governance are issue-based and issue-
specific. They cross over traditional boundaries and have, most of the 
time, a multilevel component where the national meets the transnational 
but also, more and more, the local. Hence, those subfields are to quite an 
extent deterritorialized—if not sometimes altogether virtual. They are 
also fluid and in constant evolution.
Such a complex topography comes together with a multitude of actors 
involved in the governance process. Governance fields are densely popu-
lated, and the tendency is toward increasing inclusiveness. This claim is 
not reducible to the notion of private authority and its expansion. In fact, 
regulatory arenas bring together multiple actors, blurring in particular 
the public/state and private divide. There are at least three main reasons 
for rising numbers of actors. First, many governance issues now have 
a transnational scope or at least they are being defined in that way. By 
becoming transnational, those issues are increasing in complexity and 
becoming of concern to greater numbers of actors or stakeholders across 
many boundaries (Engels 2006; McNichol 2006). Second, this evolution 
parallels a broad policy trend. The neoliberal revolution that started in 
the early 1980s initially in Great Britain and in the United States has led 
many nation-states to reorganize if not redefine themselves (Campbell and 
Pedersen 2001; Christensen, and Lagreid 2007; Djelic 2006; Plehwe, Wal-
pen, and Neunhöffer 2005). This has often meant that nation-states have 
delegated some of their rule-making and rule-monitoring prerogatives 
to semipublic or independent agencies (Gilardi 2005; Thatcher 2005). 
In search of expertise, advice, or legitimacy, the latter reach out to many 
different groups. A third explanation for this evolution is the increasing 
democratic pressure in many societies in the context of rising levels of 
education. Citizens are asking for direct involvement and flatter and more 
equalitarian forms of interaction. Deliberation and participation are on 
the rise everywhere, in transnational fields of governance but also in local 
policy discussions (Fung and Wright 2001; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; 
OECD 2001; Weeks 2000).
Rising numbers of actors means greater diversity and complexity in 
the governance process. States and state representatives remain involved. 
But they have to interact with many other “kinds” of actors: interna-
tional organizations, private firms, lobbying organizations, professional 
associations, members of expert, scientific or epistemic communities, 
nongovernmental agencies of many different stripes, pressure groups, 
and civil society representatives. The media might also play a role, pre-
senting, relaying, and commenting upon debates and discussions. Hence, 
there are many motives, objectives, perspectives, cognitive frames, and 
biases involved in transnational governance processes. And diversity is 
unmistakably a source of complexity. Another source of complexity is 
the striking blurring of boundaries between regulators and regulatees. 
In a Westphalian world, those who regulate (i.e., mostly state actors) are 
clearly differentiated from those who are regulated. In contemporary 
processes of transnational governance, those who will be regulated tend 
also to be involved in regulatory framing and monitoring. Traditional 
regulators, that is, states, are on the other hand increasingly being regu-
lated themselves.
In such complex, differentiated, and fluid fields of governance, we 
find logics of “coopetition”—a combination of cooperation and compe-
tition (Dagnino 2007). On the one hand, there is a clear temptation for 
a sense of inclusiveness. In principle, all those who are, in one way or 
another, concerned by a particular governance issue could or should be 
involved in regulatory framing and monitoring. On the other hand, in 
such an open and fluid regulatory space, we can also easily identify 
competitive logics and pressures. If an emerging set of rules does 
not appear to suit the interests and objectives of a particular actor or 
coalition, there is little that prevents them from launching an alterna-
tive regulatory initiative. The process of development and deployment 
of voluntary certification schemes in the forestry industry can illus-
trate this tension (McNichol 2006). The main umbrella organization 
coordinating certification efforts in that industry for the last fifteen 
years or so has been the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). This is 
a consensus-based, multistakeholder, international body. In 2005, it 
counted over 645 members (individual or organizational) drawn from 
a broad spectrum of interests and geographical horizons. The work 
of the FSC, though, was regularly contested and disrupted throughout 
this period by the parallel launching of rival schemes, each time under 
the impulse of various partial coalitions (McNichol 2006).
This logic of coopetition explains in part the self-sustaining and self-
reinforcing nature of contemporary dynamics of governance. Regulation 
and governance breed only, it seems, further regulation and governance. 
New rules call for even more rules in what seems to be a never ending 
spiral. The absence of an ultimate seat of legitimacy creates only fur-
ther pressure. In processes of transnational governance, who or what 
empowers a particular regulatory coalition? Its legitimacy can always 
be attacked and doubted. Hence, the question emerges rapidly of who 
regulates the regulator, who controls the controllers. The only legitimate 
answer to this question in our transnational world of governance is the 
emergence of further rules, of further regulators, certifiers, evaluators, 
and controllers.
A regularity of patterns in the background
At a surface level, therefore, we see fluidity, agitation, extreme dynamics, 
and multipolar activism. However, when we consider different gover-
nance fields in parallel and compare them, we find that those dynamics 
are in fact framed. There is a surprising regularity of patterns, across 
fields, and a striking homogeneity of background trends. It is as if trans-
national governance fields, in spite of their diversity, were all crossed and 
structured by the same logics. A way to describe this is to use the imag-
ery present in physics that fields are shaped and structured by powerful 
background forces (Martin 2003; Pire 2000).<Previously, Martin (2005) 
was cited.> Transnational governance fields, if we use this imagery, are 
also “fields of forces.” In social sciences, the notion of force when it is 
used in this way refers to broad and constraining cultural or institutional 
frames (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1977, 1984;<Bourdieu (1977) and (1984) as 
well as Lewin (1951) are not found in the References.> Lewin 1951; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977). The insights of the world society school prove 
relevant here (Krücken and Drori 2008). We propose that processes of 
transnational governance, irrespective of the peculiarities of the issues 
or fields concerned, inscribe themselves in a set of institutional forces 
that altogether make up what we can call a “transnational culture” or a 
“transnational meaning system.” The systematic comparative analysis of 
several different transnational governance fields allows us to propose that 
there are five main such forces (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).
A first institutional force is scientization, or the “extraordinary and 
expansive authority of modern scientific rationalization” (Drori and 
Meyer 2006, page)<Provide a page for the quote.> as revealed in the 
overwhelming role and presence in our contemporary world of scientific 
agencies, scientists, scientific products, and argumentation. Science 
becomes a paradigmatic umbrella, in terms of which every aspect of 
the universe can and should be interpreted, framed, and regulated. A 
second institutional force shaping fields of transnational governance is 
marketization or the belief that markets are superior arrangements for the 
allocation of goods and resources (Djelic 2006). This belief in markets 
has been institutionalizing quickly since the late 1970s, and markets 
are therefore increasingly perceived as the natural way to organize and 
structure human interactions in all spheres of economic, social, or even 
cultural and moral life. Today, we find that marketization permeates and 
structures discourses and ideologies, policies, reforms, and regulatory 
processes in many parts of the world. Organizing is a third institutional 
force being used to highly structure fields of governance. Organizing 
is a way to create a transnational order in the absence of a world state 
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2006). In the transnational context, organizing of-
ten takes the particular form of “meta-organizing,” where organizational 
members are themselves organizations. Standardization and socialization 
are important mechanisms that reconcile transnational ordering and the 
perception of autonomy that often still defines member organizations. A 
fourth institutional force is moral rationalization (Boli 2006). Celebra-
tions of virtue and virtuosity (and blaming as the negative counterpoint) 
are increasingly prominent in the global public realm via ritualized per-
formance displays: world competitions, award ceremonies, and ranking 
and accreditation processes. Rationalized and scientific assessment of 
virtue and virtuosity act as a powerful sustaining and structuring force of 
transnational governance (e.g., Barysch, Tilford, and Whyte 2008). A fifth 
institutional force that shapes and structures the ground for transnational 
governance is democracy. However, rather than by traditional representa-
tive democracy, the transnational world is increasingly permeated by a 
view of democracy that emphasizes dialogue and deliberation and the 
autonomy of the participating actor (Mörth 2006).
The five institutional forces identified here are connected; in fact 
they nurture, foster, and reinforce each other. Deliberative democracy 
generates markets for rules. The progress of marketization has, in turn, a 
tendency to rely on both formal organizing and scientized expertise. The 
disclosure and transparency associated with deliberative democracy are 
often rationalized and can even be articulated with formal and scientized 
celebrations of virtue and virtuosity. As to moral rationalization, it is 
generally revealed and expressed through sustained organizing efforts. 
When characterizing these dimensions as institutional forces, we refer to 
four meanings of “institution” (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).
1. Institutions are composed of actors, interests, relations, and
meanings; they push and pull activities in certain directions. This
is precisely why we can conceive of them as forces (cf. Hoffman
and Ventresca 2002).
2. Institutional forces become taken for granted as the natural way of
being and doing: they turn transparent (cf. Douglas 1986).
3. Institutional forces are self-reinforcing. As these forces shape
relations, interests, and bases for activities, the actions taken carry
inscribed meanings and drive activities further along the same 
path.
4. These institutional forces constitute the rules of the game in the
transnational governance world, providing frameworks for judging 
which behavioral, organizing, discursive, and interaction patterns 
are appropriate.
The close and mutually reinforcing interplay between those institution-
al forces generates, we propose, a highly structured and constrained frame 
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). This background frame explains 
quite well “the monotony” behind the “agitation” and why “changes” in 
the end appear “always the same” (Tocqueville 1993 [1840]).
Lo and behold, the regularity of patterns is striking. Still, we should 
remember the insight provided by historical institutionalism. The broad, 
common culture that frames processes of transnational governance does 
not operate in a vacuum. It encounters and has to come to terms with 
other governance traditions and legacies, structures, and practices. Hence, 
we should look at points of interface, and this will be the object of our 
conclusion.
The law of rules versus the rule of law
The dynamics of transnational governance, as explored above, do not 
give a sense of a world with no rules. The discourse on deregulation, free 
markets, or the retreat of the state hence does not give a fair picture, we 
propose, of the world we live in. This discourse is often used, interestingly, 
either by champions or by strong critics of globalization—in association 
in each case with a different value judgment. We argue that the dynamics 
of transnational governance tell a different story. There is displacement 
but in the direction of reregulation rather than deregulation. We are not 
moving toward less rules and order. In fact, we might be moving toward 
more rules and order (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005; Vogel 1996).
As described above, it is clear that the displacement we are talking 
about is quite consequential. The background frame and structure of 
human and social action has been undergoing profound transformation 
and is deeply changing in nature. A shorthand way to characterize this 
displacement is the image of a dominant, nationally based rule of law 
increasingly having to confront the progress of a transnational law of 
rules. This is not to say that nation-states and national hard law do not 
matter anymore. However, they have to compete with and confront other 
forms of rules and regulations, standards, and directives—so many soft 
law instruments that often have a transnational or supranational origin 
and projection. The difference between hard and soft law lies essentially 
in the fact that “soft law lacks the possibility of legal sanctions . . . and 
hence is not legally binding” (Mörth 2004, 1). National legislators have to 
compose with other rule-making fora that build upon different legitimacy 
bases (Héritier 2001). In fact, national hard law might even altogether 
become set within or defined by broader meta-rules or principles of a 
soft kind (Jacobsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).<The reference says 
Jacobsson (2006), not Jacobsson and Sahlin-Andersson. Which is 
correct?> The rule of law thus would seem to become, in the process, 
enmeshed in if not altogether subordinated to the law of rules.
From the rule of law . . . 
The notion of a rule of law rests on the modern aspiration to a separa-
tion between law and politics. The humanist and rationalist heritage of 
the Enlightenment combined to delineate the features of a democratic 
and progressive state where no one, including the prince, should stand 
above an impartial and just law. The rule of law was meant to displace 
the premodern rule of men. The deployment of modern nation-states 
and their claim to a democratic nature has built upon this idea as a core 
principle and aspiration. In this idealized enlightenment conception, 
“law is developed and enacted through adherence to rational principles, 
producing a set of rulings that is impartial and just” (Edelman 2004, 8). 
The modern conception of the rule of law suggests the triumph of reason 
and democracy over arbitrary power; the legislator being neutral and 
competent, just, rational, and impartial. Thomas Paine, the eighteenth-
century English pamphleteer who chose to emigrate, work, and live in 
America summarized it well.
let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far 
as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. (1776 
section III)
The notion of the rule of law is generally associated with the notion 
of constitutionalism where the power of the government is framed and 
limited by a constitution. This constitution often—but not always—
takes the form of a written text. In a continental tradition, the rule of 
law is closely associated with a roman law heritage and combines with 
a strong notion of the state, where the executive and the legislator are 
the guardians of the law and share a quasimonopoly over the design and 
promulgation of legal texts. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the rule of law 
is instead associated with a common law heritage. It rests upon the neces-
sary principle of a strict separation of powers: legislative, executive, and 
judicial. The judiciary has, in that context, a much more proactive role 
and impact as it reads, interprets, enacts, and transforms the inherited 
jurisprudence. This article cannot go much further in the exploration of 
the notion of the rule of law. From the short discussion above, I would 
merely like, at this stage, to underscore some key defining features of 
this notion, thinking in particular of the contrast with the contemporary 
evolution toward the law of rules.
First, the rule of law suggests the existence of a set of neutral, positive, 
and rational if not scientific laws and guiding frames. Second, this legal 
frame appears to be exogenous to all actors and entities in a given society 
or community, and it should rein above both those who are governed and 
those who govern. Third, even though nobody can be above the law, the 
legislator is clearly differentiated and separated from the mass of those 
who will have to follow the law. Fourth, the rule of law can easily beget 
a universalist temptation; the law applies to all equally and in equal 
ways, with ultimately little regard for particular contexts and conditions. 
Fifth, the notion of the rule of law has historically been associated with 
the emergence and development of nation-states. Hence, the rule of law 
often has a national dimension. Sixth, and as a consequence, the rule of 
law means hard laws. The national legislator, more often than not, is as-
sociated with a coercive apparatus. The legal frame is backed, therefore, 
by the hard capacity, in principle, to impose if need be enforcement and 
implementation. Needless to say that there is a fair amount of variability 
in the reality of this principle from one nation-state to another.
Naturally, the rule of law concept is in great part an ideal type, an 
idealized projection and aspiration (Edelman 2004, 9). There are many 
obstacles and limits, in real life, to a smoothly functioning rule of law 
system. First, the indeterminacy, neutrality, and impartiality of legal prin-
ciples and processes can easily be questioned. Law making, law reading 
in common law systems, or law enforcing can always be manipulated or 
steered by those with more power, influence, and resources. This means, 
concretely, that proximity with law-making institutions and processes 
in the broad sense of the term can be a source of a powerful competitive 
advantage for a given interest group. In contrast, an exclusion from those 
institutions and processes could turn out to be highly detrimental to the 
interests of another group. Formal and informal lobbying, that is, influ-
ence strategies that take different forms and scale in common and roman 
law systems, are evidence to this fluidity and malleability of hard law. 
The rule of law, in other words, is not impervious to capture. Second, the 
hardness of the law can vary quite significantly. It will depend upon the 
particular coercive capacity and resources of a given state. It might also 
be disturbed by different forms of patronage politics—a stronger word 
here being “corruption.” Third, the universalist ambition of a rule of law 
system has its own intrinsic limits. Such a system might not be able to 
deal in a satisfactory way with the contextual and particular features of 
a given situation. As such, it might in fact encourage different forms of 
legal avoidance or by-passing. Since the 1970s, particularly in the United 
States, the alternative dispute resolution movement has emerged in partial 
reaction to those limits (Barrett and Barrett 2004; Fisher and Ury 1981; 
Nolan-Haley 2001). In the words of Lauren Edelman, alternative dispute 
resolution is “grounded in an ideology of community rather than liberal 
legal rights” and it “seeks to move away from the formal constraints of 
procedural rules and precedents and towards a model that empowers the 
parties to create their own solutions to problems” (2004, pages).<Supply 
pages for the quotes.>
. . . To the law of rules
These limits draw us back toward the dynamics of contemporary gov-
ernance and the importance in that context of rules and soft law. The 
evolution described in the section above points to more (rather than 
less) order-creating activity. Rule-making activities and more broadly 
speaking order-creating activities are, furthermore, increasingly bound 
to have a transnational scope and impact. The equilibrium that we see 
emerging is not one of international anomie. But we do not see either 
the emergence of a global state that would have classical Westphalian 
features and prerogatives. There is no global institution that can produce 
legally binding principles and has control over a coercive enforcement 
apparatus giving its directives the biting power of hard law. What we do 
see, though, is the proliferation of order-creating activities of different 
kinds and the explosion, as a result, of soft law—codes, rules, contractual 
and negotiated arrangements, directives, standards, norms, evaluation, and 
ranking schemes (Boström and Garsten 2008; Brunsson and Jacobbson 
2000; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Lessig 1999; Mörth 2004; 
Tamm Hallstrom 2004;<Tamm Hallstrom (2004) is not found in the 
References.> Wedlin 2006).
Soft law progresses everywhere. Even hard law may have a tendency 
to become softer, in particular through the unmistakable “judiciariza-
tion” of many of our societies through the associated diffusion, across 
the world, of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms but also through 
the progress in several important spheres of law of a common law tra-
dition across the world. This “softization” of hard law has sometimes 
been interpreted as reflecting an Americanization of the law across the 
world (Dezalay and Garth 2002; Kagan 2007; Magendie 2001). States 
themselves come to produce, adopt, and use softer regulatory modes 
and instruments (Hood et al. 1999).<Hood et al. (1999) is not found in 
the References.> The profound transformation of many states in recent 
years through a combination of privatization, delegation, and new public 
management reforms is certainly reinforcing this trend (Christensen and 
Lagreid 2007; Gilardi 2005; Kogut and MacPherson 2008). States are 
also increasingly enmeshed in, framed, and constrained by a dense web of 
soft laws bearing upon their identities, structures, and acceptable patterns 
of action (Jacobsson 2006; Meyer et al. 1997).<See the previous note 
regarding Jacobsson vs. Jacobsson and Sahlin-Andersson.>
The concept of soft law brings together and encompasses many dif-
ferent regulatory products. As suggested above, contractual agreements 
secured through alternative dispute resolution, directives and official 
guidelines or codes, formalized standards, norms and codes of conduct, 
so-called white books, evaluation, and ranking schemes are all different 
forms of soft law. Those different instruments fit together in the sense 
that they all lack the “possibility of legal sanctions . . . and hence are not 
legally binding” (Mörth 2004, 1). At the same time, there is unmistakable 
diversity within this broad category. Let us just underscore three impor-
tant analytical frontiers. First, soft law instruments differ with respect 
to their degree of formalization. Standards elaborated by international 
standardization bodies and official guidelines produced by international 
organizations are more detailed and formalized than an industry or or-
ganizational code of conduct. Arguably, there is a trend on the whole 
toward the formalization of soft law. Second, soft law instruments can 
be differentiated with respect to their mode of production. In particular, 
what is interesting here is the degree of presence and involvement of 
nation-states in the process. A related, interesting issue appears to be 
the extent to which a particular soft law product builds upon preexisting 
local hard law bricks or is an emergent and negotiated construct (Djelic 
and Quack 2003). Third, soft law instruments do not all have the same 
“bite,” the latter presupposing the capacity, short of legal sanctions, to 
enforce and monitor them.
In spite of those within-category differences, the expanding law of rules 
associated with the progress of soft law has a number of characteristic 
features. First, soft law reflects a complex production process where many 
different actors are involved to varying degrees and in varying ways. State 
or government representatives will often be actors amongst others in a 
process where consultation, deliberation, confrontation, and negotiation 
play an important role. Second, this complex production process implies 
a blurring of boundaries between regulators and regulatees. Soft law 
regulation is often in part self-regulation. Third, soft law instruments 
are often legitimated by reference to expertise, if not science. They are 
often associated with or expressed through measurement scales (Power 
2003; Wälti, Kübler, and Papadopoulos 2004). This, naturally, fosters 
the development and expansion of an industry of expertise and rule 
making; the process thereby has the marks of being expert driven rather 
than politically driven (Engwall 2006; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 
2002). Fourth, soft law instruments are somewhat flexible, leaving space 
for interpretation and adjustment even after they have been enacted (e.g., 
Kirton and Trebilcok<In the reference, it is Tebilcock.> 2004; Sahlin-
Andersson 2004). In that respect, soft law is undeniably closer in its nature 
to common law than to code law. Although flexibility is a feature of soft 
law in general, the degree of flexibility will be relative and will depend 
upon the degree of formalization of the soft law instrument as well as 
upon the organizational and enforcement bite associated with it. Fifth, 
soft law cannot rely on state and legal coercion to ensure enforcement. 
Many new rules are voluntary. This means that those who are to comply 
should, as far as possible, be attracted to following the rules rather than 
forced to do so. There is an array of possible alternative mechanisms 
there, which will be identified and described in the next section. Still, 
the inherent flexibility of soft law combines with the absence, most of 
the time, of a strong coercive threat to create opportunities for shirking 
and avoiding, for what John Meyer calls “decoupling” and Nils Brunsson 
calls “hypocrisy” (Brunsson 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et 
al. 1997). This, undeniably, appears to be a striking feature of contem-
porary governance, particularly as it reaches transnationally. There are 
different possible ways to deal with this problem. One is to harden the 
organizational effort, to tighten as it were the “cage” associated with 
soft regulation. This means more regulatory effort still, more rules, more 
control and audit schemes, and more evaluation and ranking. Another 
way to go, naturally, is to bring the state back in, at least in an indirect 
way. A powerful incentive and trigger of soft laws and self-regulation 
still remains the threat, like the Sword of Damocles, of state interven-
tion and pending hard laws. The important differences depicted in this 
section between hard and soft law (as ideal types) are summarized in 
schematic form in Table 1.
Conclusions: The law of rules and some reflections on its 
local impact
This article points to a profound and consequential transformation when 
it comes to governance and rule making. Building upon rich conceptual 
building blocks from political science and sociology, we propose our 
own theoretical reading of this transformation. The multicentered nature 
of transnational governance combines with the dense ecology of actors 
involved to give a sense of complexity, agitation, conflict, and competi-
tion. Those are only trends at the surface level, though, we argue. We 
uncover a powerful structuring frame in the background that generates 
a kind of “monotony” in the dynamics of “agitation” to use the words 
of Tocqueville (Tocqueville 1993 [1840], vol. 2, 281). This coexistence 
between competition and cooperation, change and stability, and agita-
Table 1
Hard versus soft law: Some defining differences
Hard Law Soft Law
Production process State centered Multiplicity of actors
Production process: 
mechanisms
Vertical, top-down Horizontal, negotiation
Regulators/regulatees Strict separation Blurring of boundaries
Legitimacy base Political power or political 
representation
Science, expertise
Adaptability and flexibility Low to medium Medium to high
Principal enforcement 
mechanisms
Coercion Attraction, socialization
Decoupling Low to medium Medium to high
tion and monotony is a striking feature of contemporary transnational 
governance. We need, as shown in this paper, to combine insights from 
political science and sociological institutionalism to make theoretical 
sense of this.
While the core of this article has explored the changing logics of 
governance and rule making in our contemporary world, we turn in the 
conclusion to the issue of interface. The profound transformation of gov-
ernance processes and governance frames described above is not merely 
affecting the sphere of transnational interactions and activities. It is also 
bound to affect local and national regulatory landscapes. We need, hence, 
to explore the nature and mechanisms of this interface.
The impact of transnational rules and rule making on national systems 
can happen through what we have called elsewhere “trickle down” tra-
jectories (Djelic and Quack 2003, 315). In certain industries and sectors, 
for example, air or maritime transport, there is a fairly long tradition of 
international treaties, norms, or standards (what we would call here “soft 
law”) being directly appropriated and integrated by national constituen-
cies, sometimes in the form of hard laws. In this case, the proliferation 
of soft laws comes above and beyond an existing pool of national hard 
laws, not in replacement of them. This type of impact and mechanism 
has become increasingly important ever since the end of the World War 
Two, particularly with the multiplication of international organizations 
and supranational constructions. International organizations and supra-
national constructions elaborate and formalize different kinds of soft law 
instruments, and they have the capacity to either constrain or seduce a 
number of countries into adopting the regulatory provisions or even the 
regulatory instruments they favor or champion. The European Union is 
obviously a case in point. Quite a share of national hard law today within 
the European Union (and interestingly even beyond) is the legal transla-
tion of a European soft law instrument (Sandholtz and Stone Weet<In 
the reference, it is Stone-Sweet. Amazon has Alec Stone Sweet. Is it 
A.S. Sweet?> 1998; Schmidt 2006). Rule making triggers even more rule 
making. The proliferation of soft law can generate further rule-making 
activity of the hard kind.
With a focus on economic issues, other international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or World Trade 
Organization (WTO) should also naturally be mentioned. These organi-
zations elaborate a multiplicity of rules and significantly contribute to 
their diffusion and local adoption. At the level of the “prescriptor,” those 
rules often have the shape of soft law instruments. Locally, they might 
remain soft rules, but they could also become part of the national hard 
law apparatus as was argued above already for air and marine transport. 
The collision between those transnational rules and preexisting local or 
national laws, customs, or practices can be intense and violent and bring 
along a fair amount of local disruption, both anticipated and unanticipated 
(Rodrick 2002; Stiglitz 2002). A second type of trickle-down scenario 
connects transnational rule-making arenas that are much less formal-
ized and structured to national institutional settings. Those transnational 
rule-making arenas have been described above as multicentered and 
fluid and involving a great multiplicity of actors, both public and private 
(e.g., Botzem and Quack 2006; Djelic and Kleiner 2006; Engels 2006; 
McNichol 2006). Those arenas produce soft law instruments that will 
have locally a varying degree of bite, as we explore below.
Trickle-down trajectories can work through different kinds of mecha-
nisms. Soft law, we know, cannot directly rely on state and legal coercion 
to ensure enforcement. One simple mechanism is naturally the pure and 
simple translation of transnational rules into national hard laws. This 
can happen but is far from the only way in which transnational rules can 
have an impact. There is also space for more indirect coercive pressure, 
particularly when we talk about the impact of international organizations 
and supranational constructions. There, the concept of conditionality is 
useful (IMF 2002). The European Union or the IMF is able to tie mem-
bership or resources to strict regulatory conditions. Membership in the 
European Union is made dependent upon a profound transformation of 
local rule sets and hard law systems (Pridham 2007). Prior to the release 
of funds, the IMF can “suggest” and, de facto, even mandate compliance 
with policy guidelines and rule adjustment (Saner and Guilherme 2007). 
More generally, it is therefore possible to associate a particular transna-
tional rule or soft law with positive (including financial) incentives for 
those who will use it and negative incentives for those who will not use it. 
Other kinds of mechanisms have to do with seduction and socialization. 
Short of the ability to impose conditionality, international organizations, 
supranational constructions, and transnational regulatory networks can 
market a particular set of soft rules and deploy rhetorical, symbolic, 
resources and network strategies to frame those rules positively. Refer-
ences to science, expertise, and best practice—a connection with notions 
of efficiency, progress, development, wealth, or democratization—can 
be utilized. The structuration of socialization and acculturation spaces 
is naturally also used. Working groups, committees, conferences and 
meetings, virtual networks and working spaces, benchmark fora, and 
peer review processes are different expressions of a socialization and 
acculturation objective. Direct peer pressure and the risk of exclusion 
or more formalized strategies of naming and shaming, associated with 
transparency, information diffusion, or even ranking, might also be 
utilized in different ways. Finally, one could also identify a third type 
of mechanism, labeled here “mediation/expertise.” The formalization 
of expertise, the training of a cadre of mediators or bridges, and the 
systematic deployment of local ad-hoc missions for those mediators are 
tools that transnational organizations and arenas use extensively (e.g., 
Djelic and Kleiner 2006).
The transformation of governance processes and governance frames is 
also having an affect locally and nationally in a slightly different, more 
indirect way. The transnational spread of the neoliberal ideology coupled 
with the diffusion of relatively homogeneous reform packages is leading 
many countries to rethink, nationally, their own institutional settings and 
their own policy and regulatory processes. Neoliberalism and new public 
management combined are putting pressure indeed on nation-states to 
redefine their own structure and role, in particular with respect to rule 
making (Christensen and Lagreid 2007; Hood 1995;<Hood (1995) and 
Minogue et al. (1999) are not in the References.> Minogue et al. 1999). 
Hence, as argued above, nation-states are themselves increasingly turning 
toward soft law instruments for national and even local issues. Those soft 
law instruments come in combination of but also sometimes in partial 
replacement of traditional national hard law systems.
While the transformations described here are clearly not without 
important consequences, obviously they are not uniform either. There 
is unmistakable variability across spheres of economic and social life 
as well as across countries. Depending upon the situation, transnational 
rules will be more or less locally present and will have a greater or lesser 
impact. Those rules can purely and simply displace preexisting national 
hard laws (e.g., Botzem and Quack 2006) or they can impose themselves 
as hard laws or their equivalent in a sphere that was not regulated before 
at the local level (e.g., Djelic and Kleiner 2006). Transnational rules can 
be formally adopted, on the books, and still stay very detached from daily 
regulatory practice in a clear pattern of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Meyer et al. 1997). Finally, rules can be adopted selectively and 
in fact locally translated, adapted, and fitted to cohere with peculiar cir-
cumstances. There are a number of explanatory dimensions behind this 
variability. First, it seems that the degree of dependence of a given country 
upon the producer/champion of given rules can explain a lot. Coercive 
pressure applies particularly strongly in situations of strong dependence. 
Second, the adequacy of the preexisting regulatory frame is another key 
dimension. A country that altogether lacks a regulatory frame on a par-
ticular issue or finds that its traditional system is in crisis will be more 
likely to turn toward external, so-called legitimate regulatory solutions. 
Third, the existence (or absence) of adequate local resources, networks, or 
culture will be an explanation for the ease (difficulty) of implementation 
and hence for the degree of decoupling. Finally, one might wonder about 
the degree of centrality of a given country in the rule-making process 
itself. A country that is actively involved in a transnational process of 
rule making should normally have a greater sense of appropriation over 
the emerging rule set than a country that has been involved in a more 
passive manner (Djelic and Quack 2003, 318ff).
This brings us to a last few remarks that bear upon the democratic im-
plications of the transformations we have described. The question has in 
fact two sides to it. First, we may ask whether the process of transnational 
rule making discussed here is an improvement, in democratic terms, over 
the Westphalian “concert of nations.” This, clearly, is an open question 
and has to remain so at this stage of the paper. Approaching it would call 
for a reorientation of our collective work on transnational governance 
toward an exploration of power and hegemonic dynamics. Second, we 
certainly can wonder about what is happening at the national level. Does 
the progressive move from the rule of law to the law of rules represent, 
locally and nationally, a democratic advance? Future work should try to 
explore here the parallel redefinition of power mechanisms and a pos-
sible reshuffling of cards in the national game. Some groups are certainly 
benefiting from this evolution and others will be losing. The questions 
of who and why here again remain open ones.
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